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 Ten years of infrastructure reform in Latin America can teach
us a lot about how to make privatization work for the poor.
There are macroeconomic and microeconomic transmission
mechanisms through which such reform may affect those
sectors. This paper discusses policy instruments to increase
their access to services and make the latter more affordable
for them. The advantages and disadvantages of each
instrument are evaluated and examples are given. The ways
in which policy-makers should go about setting social
priorities in infrastructure reform and choosing the most
appropriate policy instruments in each case are then
considered. Emphasis is placed on the need for simple and
rapid empirical diagnostic tools, and finally it is stressed
that a pro-poor reform strategy requires a political
commitment from the outset of the reform process and an
integrated approach between privatization, social and
regulatory policy.
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I
Introduction
Since 1990, more than 120 developing countries have
invited the private sector to participate in the provision
of infrastructure services. Latin America has achieved
a higher degree of private sector participation than any
other region, attracting about 50% of private capital
flows to developing country infrastructure sectors
during the 1990s. Indeed, by the year 2000, 90% of
Latin American countries had achieved some degree
of private sector participation in their electricity,
telecommunications and transport sectors, and almost
half have private participation in their drinking water
sectors. Notwithstanding the widespread adoption of
private sector participation, however, the infrastructure
reform process –both in Latin America and beyond–
has raised significant social concerns. Many argue that
privatization leads to tariff increases that make services
unaffordable for the poor, and that it hands over
operational responsibilities to profit-orientated
multinationals that have no commercial interest in
extending services to urban slums and isolated villages.
In a number of well-known examples, the social unrest
created by private sector participation ultimately led to
the demise of the whole process (Cochabamba, Bolivia),
or necessitated major contract renegotiations (Buenos
Aires, Argentina).
Concern for social issues only came as an
afterthought in many reforming countries, and they
were often addressed only in order to resolve conflicts.
This is a policy failure in a region where more than a
third of the population is poor. Fiscal and efficiency
concerns dominated the agenda of policy-makers
pressed by the severity of macroeconomic problems
(Benítez, Chisari and Estache, 2000). Indeed, almost
60% of the private capital flows to the infrastructure
sectors in Latin America during the 1990s were captured
by the State in the form of privatization proceeds rather
than invested directly in the sector. Even so, overall the
infrastructure reform process has brought significant
benefits to the Latin America region, generating
US$ 290 billion of private capital flows during the
1990s and leading to substantial improvements in the
efficiency of infrastructure services. In Argentina, for
example, it is estimated that the efficiency gains
resulting from privatization amounted to one percentage
point of GDP (Chisari, Estache and Romero, 1999).
Moreover, there have also been some positive examples
of how privatization can be made to work for the poor
and provide the basis for a more conscious strategy of
harnessing public-private partnerships to meet social
objectives that cannot be fully financed from
government resources.
This paper aims to distill the lessons of ten years
of infrastructure reform experience in Latin America
about how to make infrastructure privatization work
for the poor (Estache, Foster and Wodon, 2002; Ugaz
and Waddams Price, 2002). The paper is intended for
the benefit of countries that are about to embark on
infrastructure reform, or to make significant ‘second
generation’ policy adjustments. A menu of options is
provided, from which policy-makers can select the most
suitable pro-poor infrastructure reform strategy for any
particular country or sector. The structure of the paper
is a follows: section II provides an overview of the
macroeconomic and microeconomic transmission
mechanisms through which infrastructure reform can
affect the poor, with the primary focus centered on the
microeconomic linkages, notably the ways in which
reform affects access to infrastructure services by the
poor and the affordability of those services for them.
In section III we discuss policy instruments that can be
used to ensure that infrastructure reforms result in
increased access to services by the poor. The advantages
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and disadvantages of each instrument are evaluated, and
a number of concrete examples provided. In section
IV, we review the policy instruments that can be used
to ensure that infrastructure services remain affordable
to poor households following reform of the sector, and
once again the advantages and disadvantages of each
instrument are evaluated and examples given.
Section V considers how policy-makers should go
about setting social priorities in infrastructure reforms
and choosing the most appropriate policy instruments
for each case, with emphasis on the need for simple
and rapid empirical diagnostics of how infrastructure
services affect the poor, and finally section VI explains
why the definition of a pro-poor reform strategy requires
a political commitment from the outset of the reform
process, as well as the adoption of an integrated
approach between privatization, social and regulatory
policies.
II
Macro and micro linkages
between reform and the poor
From a macroeconomic perspective, there are three
ways in which infrastructure reform can have an impact
on the welfare of the poor: by promoting economic
growth; by affecting employment levels; and by
reallocating public expenditures.
Infrastructure investments are important for
economic growth, which is in turn one of the main
engines of poverty reduction. Evidence from Bolivia,
Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela indicates that a 10%
increase in infrastructure stocks has been found to lead
to a 1.5% increase in GDP (Canning, Fay and Perotti,
1992; Canning, 1998; De la Fuente, 2000), which is
important because in Latin America a single percentage
point of growth reduces the number of people living in
poverty by half a percentage point (Wodon, 2000d).
There is also evidence from Argentina and Brazil that
differentials in infrastructure endowments (such as
roads and access to sanitation) have been a significant
impediment to convergence between rich and poor
regions over the last 20 years (Eberts, 1990; Estache
and Fay, 1995; Ferreira, 1996; Ferreira and Malliagros,
1998).
Another consequence of privatization and reform
is the shedding of labour to raise the efficiency and
profitability of infrastructure service providers. In
Argentina the utilities workforce shrank from 300,000
in the 1980s to around 50,000 by 1993 (Alexander,
2000). The immediate impact of such layoffs can be
cushioned by the design of adequate labour redundancy
packages, and in the longer run –to the extent that sector
reform contributes to economic growth and thereby new
jobs– the initial layoffs in the public utilities may be
compensated by job creation in other sectors (Galal et
al., 1994). Still, the transition is difficult and should be
a major item of concern for policy-makers.
Finally, infrastructure services have traditionally
absorbed large volumes of public resources to cover
operating subsidies and finance new investments.
Reform of the sector and the participation of private
capital offer the opportunity to make these services
financially self-sufficient, thereby freeing up fiscal
resources for other programmes. To the extent that these
funds are diverted to programmes whose incidence is
more progressive than that of the original infrastructure
subsidies, there is potential for reform to benefit the
poor (Baffes and Shah, 1998). In Colombia, for
instance, subsidies for the consumption of utility
services such as water, sewerage, electricity and gas
are substantially less progressive than public
expenditures on health, education and rural
development (Vélez, 1995).
The microeconomic linkages between
infrastructure reform and the poor fall into two
categories, namely those that affect either access to
services by the poor, or their capacity to pay for them.
Table 1 summarizes the main linkages between
infrastructure reform and the poor, and identifies the
corresponding mitigating policy instruments that will
be described in greater detail in the following sections.
Reform and private sector participation can affect
access to infrastructure services in many ways. Reform
may lead to increases in the initial connection fees for
infrastructure services that may historically have been
provided at minimal charge. Typical connection fees
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TABLE 1
Microeconomic linkages between infrastructure reform and the poor
Access Impact Mitigating policy instruments
Rising connection charges The connection charge may increase substantially • Select cheaper technologies for network expansion.
with the arrival of private operators who must recoup • Provide credit for repayment of connection charges.
the costs of network expansion. • Allow households to contribute labour for civil
 works.
• Cross-subsidize connection costs through user
tariffs.
• Provide connection subsidies to poor households.
Diluting incentives It may not be commercially attractive for private • Impose universal service obligations on operators.
operators to serve poor customers who live in costly • Specify connection targets in low-income areas.
outlying areas, consume modest amounts of the • Provide connection subsidies to poor households.
service, and may not be accustomed to paying.
Outlawing alternatives Privatization may restrict access to some alternative • Oblige dominant utilities to provide alternative
services, especially if connection to public network is services.
mandatory. • Allow licensed entry of alternative suppliers.
• Promote partnerships between dominant utility and
alternative suppliers.
Affordability Impact Mitigating policy instruments
Increasing tariffs Average tariff levels can increase substantially (10% • Introduce lifeline tariffs.
to 100%) due to cost recovery requirements. • Apply targeted tariff discounts.Provide vouchers
for services.
• Reduce fixed charges. Control the level
of
consumption.
• Increase frequency of billing.
• Use prepayment devices.
Formalizing payment In order to improve revenue collection, private See above.
operators will formalize illegal connections and
enforce billing on pain of disconnection.
Rebalancing tariffs The removal of historic cross-subsidies may See above.
accentuate increases in tariffs of services used by the
poor.
Raising quality standards Average tariff levels can increase, due to more • Where possible, allow operators to provide
demanding quality-of -service standards different price and quality combinations to different
customer groups.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
charged by the private sector are of the order of several
hundred US dollars, and are thus beyond the economic
reach of poor households, unless there is some kind of
option to pay by installments. There is thus a danger
that poor households may not be able to afford service
connections after the reform process. Low income
families tend to live in outlying settlements that are
costly to serve and consume only modest amounts of
infrastructure services, which they may not even be
accustomed to paying for. Since private operators are
driven primarily by profit considerations rather than
public policy objectives, they may not find it
commercially attractive to extend services to low
income customers. Finally, many poor households rely
on informal alternatives to modern infrastructure
services, such as private vendors, next door neighbours
or self-supply. Reform processes sometimes attempt to
outlaw these small-scale alternative providers, thereby
reducing the options available to the poor.
There are also ways in which reform can raise
affordability issues for those among the poor who
already enjoy access to the services. First, in order to
make infrastructure services financially self-sustaining,
it may be necessary to increase tariffs that have been
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kept artificially below the cost of provision for many
years. Tariff increases can be quite substantial (of the
order of 10% to 100%), but they are to some extent a
political option and can be mitigated if the government
is willing to accept a lower sale value for infrastructure
assets. Moreover, where effective competition or
incentive-based regulation is introduced, tariffs may
decrease over time.
Second, State-owned utilities have traditionally
taken a relaxed attitude to illegality and non-payment.
In contrast, private operators have a strong incentive to
insist on the formalization of illegal connections and
enforce service payments (on pain of disconnection), so
as to ensure the collection of enough revenue to cover
operating costs. As a result, following sector reform, some
poor households may find themselves paying for services
for the first time. However, this is not necessarily a bad
thing, since illegality is often not in the interest of poor
households. Informal connections are often unsafe
(contaminated drinking water, risks of electrocution), and
may entail payments to local mafia bosses. Moreover,
establishing a formal relationship with a utility can be a
first step towards obtaining the proof of residence
necessary to obtain credit and access to other services.
Third, in sectors where competition is introduced,
it becomes necessary to phase out historical cross-
subsidies between customer groups, leading to
substantial tariff rebalancing. One example is the
increase in local telephone charges and the
corresponding decrease in long distance and
international telephone charges that typically follows
sector reform. To the extent that poor households make
disproportionate use of services that historically
benefited from cross-subsidies, they may be adversely
affected (Gómez-Lobo, 1996).
Finally, the desire to improve service quality is
often an important motivating factor in infrastructure
reform. However, quality improvements generally
require significant investments in upgrading
infrastructure, and therefore feed through into higher
service tariffs for consumers. While raising quality
standards is clearly a desirable outcome, it may raise
issues of affordability for low income households
(Baker and Tremolet, 2000).
III
Policy instruments for improving
access to basic services
While improvements in access to infrastructure services
are more likely to be pro-poor than the current situation,
the evidence suggests that the poor (and especially the
very poor) still often do not benefit as much as others
from gains in access (Ajwad and Wodon, 2002a and
2002b). Special efforts, programmes and regulatory
oversight are needed in order to ensure that the benefits
reach the poor. Table 2 reviews a number of instruments
available for improving access to services for the poor,
together with their advantages and disadvantages (see
also Komives, Whittington and Wu, 2000). These
instruments are not mutually exclusive, and indeed
successful examples of reforms in Latin America
combine several of them. The instruments in table 2
fall into three categories: requiring operators to provide
access; reducing connection costs; and increasing the
range of suppliers.
1. Requiring operators to provide access
Let us first consider requirements to provide access.
Regulatory measures can be used to counteract the lack
of commercial incentives for serving low income
customers. Universal Service Obligations are typically
incorporated in licenses and concession contracts and
require operators to provide services within a specified
time period to any consumer that requests them within
a specified geographical area. Although politically
appealing, such obligations are not all that meaningful
in practice because they fail to take into account the
fact that low income households may not be able to
afford service, and hence would not be in a position to
request it (Chisari and Estache, 1999). They also
overlook the fact that for communities that are beyond
the existing network, service expansion needs to take
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TABLE 2
Summary of instruments for promoting access
Advantages Disadvantages
Instruments requiring operators to provide access
Universal Service Obligations Provide a legal obligation to serve all customers, The obligation is rather vague, and places the onus
including those that may not be commercially on the customer to request the service. This may
attractive. not be very meaningful if poor customers cannot
afford connection charges or live far away from
existing networks.
Connection  Targets Force a concrete definition of realistic coverage Require symmetrical obligation on users to
targets, ensuring that unprofitable customers are connect, which limits freedom of choice. Attention
served.  Can be monitored and enforced by use of must still be given to affordability of connection
financial penalties. charges if tariffs are to be met.
Instruments reducing the cost of connection
Low cost technologies Improve the affordability of infrastructure May lead to reduced quality of service.
connections, without generating the need for
subsidies, and reduce the overall investment cost
of reaching universal access targets.
Labour contributions Allow households to contribute in terms of an There may be significant costs in training and
abundant resource (time) rather than a scarce supervising community volunteer labour.
resource (money). Avoid need for external
finance.
Credit  lines Address what is sometimes the real If provided by private operator, may lead to
underlying problem: credit constraints rather than increased risk exposure. Otherwise, require
absolute affordability. collaboration of micro-credit institutions.
Connection  subsidies Target subsidy funds to low income individuals. Require government finance and are relatively
Administrative costs are relatively low as a costly per household connected. User co-financing
proportion of subsidies awarded. For community should be required to ensure commitment.
level subsidies, competitive forces can be used to
keep costs down.
Connection  cross-subsidies Do not require external source of funding and Require the unconnected population to be small
spread cost over a large connected population relative to the connected population. The connected
(often  with greater ability to pay than the population may be unwilling to shoulder the
unconnected population). Somewhat equitable subsidy.
if  connections were provided free of charge prior
to privatization.
Instruments that increase supply options
Broader service obligations Ensure that an alternative is available for house- Except in the case of telephones,  there is evidence
holds which are not able to connect to the network that even poor households prefer private
connections. Communal supply points tend to be
unprofitable and therefore need to be closely
regulated.
Licensed entry  of alternatives Provides choice to consumers. Increases May make investment unattractive to dominant
competitive pressures on the dominant utility. utility. May be difficult to regulate small suppliers
to ensure adequate quality of service.
Promotion of partnerships Improve quality of supply to communities lacking May be difficult to achieve collaboration between
connections to the dominant utility, while the formal and informal sectors.
reducing commercial risk to dominant utility from
serving marginal communities
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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place in a coordinated fashion, and not simply at the
request of an individual.
A tighter approach is to incorporate connection
targets requiring the operator to make a specified
number of new connections within a certain time period.
In 1997, this approach was successfully used in the 30-
year water and sewerage concession for the twin cities
of La Paz and El Alto in Bolivia (Komives and Brook,
1999; Carbonel, 2000; Foster and Irusta, 2001). The
government awarded the concession to the private
operator willing to make the largest number of new
connections in the low-income neighbourhoods of El
Alto. Thus, the winning bidder was contractually
obliged to connect 72,000 families to piped water and
38,000 families to sewerage over a five-year period,
and as a result the annual rate of new connections to
both water and sewerage services increased by about
66% following the reform. Household survey evidence
shows that the coverage of water in low income
households in El Alto –which was almost static at 65%
between 1989 and 1994– jumped to about 98% between
1994 and 1999.
This example illustrates that it is critical that the
connection targets be geographically referenced to low
income communities, otherwise the operator will meet
them simply by taking services to the most lucrative
segments of the market (which is what would have
happened anyway in the absence of connection targets).
Connection targets should be carefully monitored and
enforced through financial penalties. Although they
represent an improvement on the Universal Service
Obligation, concerns about the affordability of
connection charges remain valid. In practice,
obligations to serve the poor are much more effective
when they are combined with financial incentives. This
could mean, for example, providing ‘smart subsidies’
to operators that connect poor consumers, or ensuring
that the tariff revenue from serving poor customers fully
covers the cost of service provision so that they are
financially attractive to serve, even if a part of this cost
is ultimately subsidized (Jadresic, 2000). These issues
will be explored further in the next section.
2. Reducing connection costs
There are several instruments that can help to reduce
connection costs for poor households. In many
countries, there is a tendency to enforce rigid
technological standards for infrastructure networks that
are often comparable with those prevailing in
industrialized countries (Brook and Tynan, 1999).
Although such standards guarantee a high-quality
service, they may also have the effect of making the
service so expensive that it is not affordable to the poor.
Greater flexibility is called for, and governments should
experiment with technologies that may provide a
slightly lower quality of service but at a significantly
lower cost. Also, while poor households are cash
constrained, they may have labour time available,
particularly if they live in areas affected by
underemployment. It is often desirable to allow people
to contribute part of the cost of a new connection ‘in
kind’ by volunteering their labour (while recognizing
that such volunteer labour may require a commitment
from the utility in terms of training and supervision).
The ‘condominium’ approach to water and
sewerage networks developed in Brazil during the
1980s shows how technological innovation can be used
to reduce the costs of providing services to poor
households. By routing networks through backyards
and across sidewalks, instead of down the center of
streets, savings are made in the length and diameter of
pipes and the depth they need to be buried at.
Community labour is also used to build the networks,
which reduces costs and increases ownership. Overall,
savings of the order of 40-50% have been achieved
(Foster, 2001).
Another reason why poor households find it
difficult to pay connection charges is that they do not
have savings, nor access to credit, that would enable
them to make a large capital payment. Connection
charges may become affordable if they can be spread
over a sufficiently long period of time and credit lines
can be offered directly by the utility (in the form of
payment by installments) or micro-credit institutions.
Credits of this kind may also help households to finance
housing investments needed to make full use of an
infrastructure connection: for example wiring in the
case of electricity, and plumbing in the case of water
and sewerage (the cost of these complementary
investments may be as high as the connection charge
itself). There is also the possibility of providing direct
government subsidies to cover at least some portion of
the connection costs for customers who meet eligibility
criteria (connection subsidies are easy to target when a
high proportion of unconnected households are poor,
and administrative costs can be kept low). Connection
subsidies could also be allocated competitively to the
operators willing to provide service at the lowest cost.
Where public finance is not available, connection
subsidies can be funded by a surcharge on all utility
bills, or by special funds. This introduces a cross-
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subsidy from existing customers to new customers,
since part of the cost of network expansion is covered
through the service tariff, but it may be equitable if
existing customers received their connections on a
subsidized basis in the past.
One of the central objectives of the Buenos Aires
water concession was to expand the access of low
income households (Alcázar, Abdala and Shirley, 1999;
Ferro, 1999). However, under the original terms of the
contract, an infrastructure charge of 300-600 pesos for
water and 800-900 pesos for sewerage was mandatory
for new connections, and even with the possibility of
paying by installments, such charges were out of reach
for poor families living on 200-250 pesos per month.
The high level of charges provoked civil unrest, leading
to a renegotiation of the original concession contract,
and the solution finally adopted was to levy a universal
service fee of 6 pesos per month on all water customers
and waive the infrastructure charge for new customers.
This approach illustrates how the introduction of a
cross-subsidy from existing to new customers was
successful in overcoming the social problems caused
by the original approach.
A slightly different approach has been taken in the
telecommunications sector, where many countries have
introduced rural funds as part of the reform process.
These funds are financed from the proceeds of spectrum
license auctions, or via universal service levies of the
order of 1% on the turnover of the sector. The funds
finance one-time capital grants to private operators
willing to operate public telephones in commercially
unattractive rural areas for at least 10 years, and they
are competitively allocated to the operator requesting
the lowest subsidy. Such programmes have succeeded
in bringing public telephone services to 19,000 rural
communities in four countries. Moreover, every dollar
of public subsidy has leveraged at least two dollars of
private investment.
3. Increasing the range of suppliers
There are several instruments which can also help to
increase the range of suppliers. Many poor households
are served by small-scale alternative providers who
frequently offer a balance of cost and quality that is
better suited to low income customers than services
provided by conventional utilities (Erhardt, 2000).
When it is simply not feasible to achieve universal
access to network services quickly, alternative services
may be the only option available. It is thus important
to ensure that the reform process takes into account the
potential role of these providers in reaching the poor
(Solo, 1999a and 1999b; Solo and Paniagua, 1999).
In some instances there may be genuine problems
in relying on alternative service providers: for example,
if they represent a major water quality risk or involve
irrational exploitation of common-property water
resources. Where this is the case, it makes sense to
redefine the legal obligation of the dominant utility from
providing a particular technology (e.g., piped water) to
providing a service (e.g., drinking water to the
household) by whatever technological means is
appropriate (whether it be public tankers, public
standpipes, or resale via a street vendor or neighbour).
In this way, the dominant utility is required to take into
account the needs of all the population and not simply
those that are already connected to a modern
infrastructure network.
In cases where alternative providers do not present
conflicts with the public interest, they should be
regarded as part of the solution, rather than part of the
problem. Thus, far from being outlawed they should
be given full legal status equivalent to that enjoyed by
the formal utility (Kariuki and Acolor, 2000). Where
feasible and appropriate, they should also be submitted
to some regulatory control to ensure that they do not
exploit customers, either in terms of the prices that they
charge or the safety of the services they provide. Finally,
small-scale alternative providers may work in
partnership with the conventional utility, each building
on their respective strengths and complementarities. For
example, the utility may have a comparative advantage
in the bulk production of potable water, while small-
scale providers may have a comparative advantage in
billing and distributing water in precarious peri-urban
settlements. The regulatory framework should be
sufficiently flexible to contemplate such partnerships
when they are in the interests of the end consumer.
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IV
Policy instruments for improving
consumption affordability
Infrastructure reform processes often lead to tariff
increases. Tariff structures that have significant standing
charges or minimum monthly consumption charges can
be particularly unfavourable to low-income customers
who consume small amounts of the service. From a
social perspective, it is desirable to keep these charges
low, while recognizing that for the utility such charges
may be an important reflection of the fixed costs
associated with billing and servicing customers. In
general terms, table 3 suggests instruments that can be
used to safeguard the affordability of services, together
with an overview of their advantages and disadvantages.
In many cases, there are gains from using several
instruments at the same time, since many are
complementary to each other.1 Broadly, such
instruments influence affordability in at least one of
three ways: reducing the bills to be paid by poor
households; reducing the cost of services; and
facilitating the payment of bills. Whatever the option
chosen, when designing tariffs and subsidies that help
to reduce the utility bills paid by poor households, care
must be taken to establish simple, transparent and
accurate eligibility criteria for identifying the poor and
to avoid perverse distortions in the behaviour of utilities
and their customers.
1. Reducing the bills faced by poor households
A popular way of reflecting social concerns in tariff
structures is to define a “lifeline” subsistence
consumption block that is provided below its economic
cost (Maddock and Castaño, 1991; Garbacz and
Thompson, 1997). In some cases, the lifeline is available
to all customers, while in others it is targeted only at
specific customer groups. The revenue shortfall from
lifeline consumption can be covered by the State or by
a cross-subsidy from those consuming higher volumes
of the service. Lifeline tariffs are based on the
assumption that poor consumers tend to be small
consumers. This is not necessarily true, however, if one
takes into account the prevalence of large families,
shared dwellings, and the practice of secondary retailing
of services between neighbours.
The available empirical evidence indicates that the
existing lifeline tariffs may not be very effective at
reaching the poor. The electricity tariff in Honduras,
for example, provides subsidized power to all domestic
consumers using less than 300 kWh per month, at an
annual cost of US$17 million to the government.
However, analysis shows that about 80% of this subsidy
goes to non-poor households. The reason is that many
poor people remain unconnected to the network, and
those that are connected consume well below 300 kWh
per month (Wodon, Ajwad and Siaens, 2002). A similar
policy exists in Guatemala, where the annual cost of
US$50 million is financed via cross-subsidies from
commercial and industrial customers. Given that only
40% of poor families in Guatemala have access to
electricity, about 90% of the value of the subsidy goes
to benefit the non-poor (Foster and Araujo, 2002).
An alternative to lifeline tariffs is to use identifying
characteristics (means-testing) to target discounts on
the poor. In some countries, place of residence is used
to determine eligibility. Elsewhere, eligibility is based
on socioeconomic characteristics or on the
characteristics of the connection. Once again, the
discounts can be financed by the State or via cross-
subsidies from households that do not qualify. One
option is to treat cross-subsidies as a surcharge on utility
bills that goes into a trust fund for financing social
tariffs. Utilities are then allowed to draw upon these
resources against certified evidence that they are
providing discounted service tariffs to identified low-
income consumers. A drawback of means-testing versus
lifeline systems is the need to incur administrative costs
for screening customers for eligibility, but this cost can
be reduced by using a similar targeting mechanism for
many different programmes (Foster, Gómez-Lobo and
Halpern, 2000; Clert and Wodon, 2001). Furthermore,
Wodon, Ajwad and Siaens (2002) show that means-
testing can be much more efficient in identifying the
poor than lifeline tariffs, so that it should more than
1 An interesting example of using instruments jointly is that of
Electricité de France (EDF) in France (see Wodon, 2000a, 2000b
and 2002c).
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TABLE 3
Summary of instruments for promoting affordability
Advantages Disadvantages
Instruments reducing bills paid by poor households
Lifeline  tariffs Entail minimal administrative costs. Based on the questionable assumption that poor
customers are small consumers. However, as a
result of large families, shared dwellings, and
reliance on secondary retailing (sales between
neighbours) this will not necessarily be the case.
Targeted tariff discounts May provide a more reliable way of identifying It is difficult to find good targeting variables, and
low-income households. administrative costs may be significant. May be
difficult to raise subsidy or cross-subsidy funds.
Vouchers May provide a more reliable way of identifying May be administratively complex and open to
low income households, give added flexibility abuse; remains difficult to identify good targeting
for user to select service provider, and ensure that variables and raise fiscal funds.
low income customers remain commercially
attractive.
Tariff  re-balancing Reduces burden of fixed costs on small consumers The overall impact on affordability may not be
large, and utilities may need to cover fixed costs
of billing.
Instruments reducing cost of service
Lower quality  of service Allows consumers to choose their preferred May not always be technologically possible to
balance between the cost and quality of service. differentiate quality of service provided through
a common network.
Consumption  limiting devices Prevent low income households from consuming May lead to hardship if basic needs exceed imposed
beyond their means. consumption ceiling.  Moreover, required metering
technology may be prohibitively expensive. Also
runs against the private operator’s commercial
incentives.
Instruments facilitating payment of bills
Billing  frequency Facilitates budgeting for low income households Increases administrative costs of revenue
collection, but may improve revenue collection
rates.
Prepayment  devices Facilitate budgeting for low income households May lead to ‘self-disconnection’.  May be costly
and subject to fraud.  Requires the creation of a
network for selling ‘smart cards’ if electronic
technology is used.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
compensate for the administrative costs involved. Under
means-testing, some discounts may take the form of
vouchers defraying the cost of utility bills while
allowing users to select their service provider. While
voucher schemes may be complex, the basic principle
of applying the same cost-reflective tariffs to all
customers (while providing vouchers) is important
because it ensures that low-income customers remain
commercially attractive to utilities.
Colombia provides an interesting example of
geographically targeted discounts for the poor. The
scheme is endorsed by the Constitution of 1991, which
requires utility tariffs to be based on principles of social
solidarity. This has been achieved by classifying all
neighbourhoods in the country into one of six
socioeconomic strata, based on the quality of housing
(for example, the materials with which it is constructed)
and the extent of neighborhood amenities (such as street
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lighting, green areas). According to the 1994 Public
Utilities Law, neighbourhoods in strata one to three may
have their tariffs subsidized by a maximum of 50% for
strata one, tapering down to 15% for strata three. The
resulting revenue shortfall is covered from a surcharge
of up to 20% to be applied to the bills of households in
strata five and six, as well as commercial and industrial
customers. The scheme is successful in reaching the
poor (95% of them live in neighbourhoods belonging
to strata one to three), but there is also high leakage
(80% of residents of those three types of
neighbourhoods are not poor) (Contreras and Gómez-
Lobo, 2000).
2. Reducing the cost of services
Another way of keeping services affordable for poor
households is to reduce the cost of providing them. This
can be achieved either by providing a lower quality of
service or by placing physical limits on the amount of
the service that a household can consume. Poor
households may prefer to accept a lower quality of
service, if in return they are charged a lower tariff. Yet,
in practice, most utilities tend to offer a single service
level, which is determined with reference to industrialized
country standards and may therefore be unaffordable for
poor households. While safety standards should not be
compromised, there may be other ways to differentiate
the quality of service provided to different customer
groups. One example is reliability, where some customers
may be willing to accept a higher frequency of service
interruptions in return for a lower tariff. Of course, this
kind of approach must be based on consultation with
the affected communities. Another complaint made by
low income households is that utility bills are
unpredictable, and that it is therefore difficult to keep
consumption within affordable limits. One possibility
here is to install physical devices that limit the amount
of the service that can be drawn through the connection.
In the case of electricity, this takes the form of load
limiters, which restrict the total number of appliances
that can be switched on at the same time, while in the
case of water, small-diameter connections can be used
to limit the flow of water into a dwelling. In telephony, it
is easy to cap the number of minutes of use each month.
The advantage of these devices is that they keep
consumption levels –and hence utility bills– below a
predetermined upper limit.
3. Facilitating payment of bills
A key difference between modern utilities and
traditional substitutes is the frequency of payment.
Whereas households buy candles and tankered water
on a daily or weekly basis, electricity and piped water
are typically billed no more than once per month.
Since poor households have negligible reserves of
working capital, it may be difficult to pay for a whole
month’s consumption in one go. One solution is for
utilities to bill more frequently, although this entails
higher administrative costs. Alternatively, ‘utility
stamps’ can be sold through retail outlets so that
households can pay for services gradually during the
course of the month. Another way of giving
households payment flexibility is to use prepayment
devices rather than standard billing. This reduces the
commercial risk faced by utilities, since customers are
not given credit for the use of the service. Prepayment
systems have been successful in widening the
ownership of cellular telephones. However, in some
sectors prepayment meter technologies remain
expensive to install.
An example of the successful use of prepayment
devices comes from Bolivia, where until 1995 cellular
telephony services were the monopoly of Telefónica
Celular de Bolivia (Telecel). The cost of a telephone
was high, and subscribers were required to pay for
both incoming and outgoing calls. In 1995, however,
a second cellular license was awarded to the Empresa
Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (Entel), and with the
advent of competition, the ‘calling party pays’ rule
was adopted, leading to an effective reduction of about
70% in the cost of using a cellular telephone.
Prepayment telephones were also introduced with
payment card denominations as low as US$ 5. As a
result, the number of cellular subscribers in Bolivia
has grown by a factor of ten between 1996 and 1999,
and prepaid telephones have accounted for 86% of
the growth in mobile telephony since 1998. Evidence
suggests that many prepaid telephone subscribers are
artisans and micro-entrepreneurs who use the
telephone mainly for receiving calls from clients,
keeping their own expenditures under control by
purchasing low value phone cards. A wide variety of
systems for facilitating the payment of bills have also
been implemented in many OECD countries (Wodon,
1999 and 2000a).
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V
Defining pro-poor infrastructure reform strategies
In the preceding sections we identified ways in which
infrastructure sector reform may prejudice the poor, and
we presented instruments to attenuate such impacts. In
order to apply these concepts to a particular country or
sector, it is necessary to have a good empirical
understanding of the social dimensions of infrastructure
services. Much of the needed information may already
be available from existing sources, such as census data,
household surveys or utility databases. However,
significant efforts are often required to pull it all
together. In some cases, it may be necessary to
contemplate new survey work to collect information
on important policy variables, which can then be used
to answer three key questions: i) should the primary
policy focus be on improving access or affordability?;
ii) which policy instruments are likely to be the most
effective in reaching these goals?; and iii) which
infrastructure services should be given the highest social
priority?
Both access and affordability are important, and
there is no point in providing poor households with
access to a service that they cannot afford. Nevertheless,
resources are constrained and it is often necessary to
focus attention on one objective or the other. In general,
improving affordability is more likely to benefit the
better-off, rather than increasing access for those who
are not yet connected, partly because the second group
is poorer. There may, however, be a threshold beyond
which providing additional access may be less poverty-
reducing than providing subsidies to those who already
have access (Wodon and Ajwad, 2002). There is also
evidence that households with network access are able
to satisfy their basic needs much more cost-effectively
than those without. For example, in Guatemala
households with electricity pay less than US$ 0.10 per
kilowatt-hour to light up their homes, while those
without rely on candles that cost the equivalent of US$ 5
per kilowatt-hour (Foster and Tre, 2000; Foster, Tre and
Wodon, 2000). Similarly, in Port-au-Prince, Haiti,
households with piped water connections pay US$ 1.00
per cubic meter, while those without pay US$ 10 per
cubic meter to obtain water from private vendors.
Simple diagnostic tools can be used to determine
whether access charges are affordable to the poor. For
example, the connection charge can be divided by the
monthly income of a typical poor household, and if no
direct information on monthly income is available, the
minimum wage or poverty line can be used instead.
While there are no hard and fast rules, the resulting
ratio gives an idea of how unaffordable connection
charges may be. For example, if the connection charge
represents six months of family income, it is clearly
beyond the economic reach of the poor. It is also
important to find out whether the utility offers the
possibility of payment in installments, and if so, what
proportion of monthly income such installments
represent for the poor. For example, if each installment
absorbs 25% of monthly income, then the service
remains unaffordable in spite of the opportunity to pay
by installments. One can also assess the extent to which
poor households connect to utility services when
infrastructure networks are available in their
communities. Recent evidence from Guatemala and
Honduras shows that up to a third of households without
access to electricity and piped water live next to public
mains and distribution lines, but nonetheless they are
not connected (Foster and Araujo, 2002; Estache, Foster
and Wodon, 2002). While there are a number of
potential explanations for this phenomenon, it clearly
suggests that the connection may not be affordable.
Similarly, simple diagnostic tools exist for
assessing the affordability of using a service. For
example, the amount that connected poor households
pay for the service as a percentage of their total
household budget can be computed. If expenditure data
are available, it is possible to infer the physical amount
of the service that families are consuming, and compare
this to a subsistence benchmark, to see whether the poor
are consuming ‘enough’. It is also possible to compare
the expenditures of low income connected households
on utility services with the amount paid for substitute
services by similar low income households that do not
enjoy network access. In Guatemala, poor households
with access to electricity spend as much on lighting
and powering appliances as poor households without
electricity do for comparable purposes, but the former
derive much more benefit from their electricity
connections than the latter do from substitute sources.
Even when household survey data are not available,
the utility tariff structure itself can be used to calculate
113C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 8  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 2
MAKING INFRASTRUCTURE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA WORK FOR THE POOR  •  ANTONIO ESTACHE,
VIVIEN FOSTER AND QUENTIN WODON
the monthly bill for a reference level of subsistence
consumption and compare this with the typical monthly
income of a poor household. Where the necessary
resources are available, another possibility is to conduct
a household survey designed to measure the stated
willingness to pay for the service.
Once priorities have been identified, the next step
is to select instruments for promoting access,
affordability, or both. While some instruments have no
budgetary implications, others do, in which cases costs
must be estimated, taking into account administrative
costs, say, for screening eligible households. Since an
important part of the cost is due to resources that ‘leak
away’ to households that were not intended to be
beneficiaries, it is important to make a realistic
evaluation of the likely targeting performance of the
subsidy or policy (Contreras and Gómez-Lobo, 2000).
It is also difficult to design a subsidy programme that
does not introduce some kind of perverse incentive.
For example, subsidies may reduce commercial
incentives for utilities to serve poor customers, by
reducing the revenue that they capture from doing so.
Subsidies can also distort the behaviour of consumers,
by generating potentially wasteful consumption, efforts
to qualify for the subsidy by fraudulent means, attempts
to sell or pass on subsidy benefits to non-eligible
consumers, or reduced interest in improving income
and living conditions in order to avoid losing eligibility
(poverty trap mechanisms). Subsidies linked to location
or the characteristics of dwellings may also be
capitalized in the rental value of the property, thereby
reducing the benefits for poor tenants. Finally, while
social policies tend to be designed on a sector-by-sector
basis, overall budget constraints mean that governments
also need to take into account priorities within
infrastructure sectors, as well as between infrastructure
and other sectors.
A number of analytical tools have been developed
in recent years to aid decisions on which types of
subsidies to provide. By using Consumption
Dominance curves, it is possible to compare the
poverty-reducing impact of subsidies to different sectors
(Makdissi and Wodon, 2002).2 Results for Latin
American countries suggest that subsidies for water and
urban transport have more impact on poverty than
subsidies for electricity and telephony. By decomposing
measures of inequality across different components of
expenditure, it is possible to identify how subsidies are
likely to affect inequality (see for example Wodon and
Yitzhaki, 2002). In Mexico, this methodology suggested
among others that subsidies for water reduced
inequality, subsidies for electricity were neutral in this
respect, and subsidies for telecommunications increased
inequality. Finally, the impact of subsidies and access
on inequality measures can be compared, taking into
account the value of access for households which are
connected to the network, by using hedonic regressions,
for example (Siaens and Wodon, 2002).
Table 4 summarizes the main questions that must
be answered in order to define a strategy for pro-poor
infrastructure reform and identifies the information that
needs to be collected to provide well-founded empirical
answers to those questions. Figure 1 provides a simple
decision tree for determining priorities between access
and affordability issues.
2 Consumption Dominance or CD curves are used to test whether
the reduction in poverty induced by a marginal tax reform, a price
reform, or a subsidy reform for two commodities is robust over a
large set of poverty measures and poverty lines. The method is
similar in spirit to checking for non-intersecting concentration
curves, but it enables the analyst to choose the so-called order of
stochastic dominance of interest, rather than being limited to the
second order of dominance. Moreover, the method extends previous
results for the impact of tax, price, or subsidy reforms on poverty
measures of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) type to a larger class
of poverty measures, and to cases where there is a differential in
the efficiency cost of raising public funds through various
commodities (or, more generally, differences in the behavioral
impact of tax, price and subsidy reforms).  For details, see Makdissi
and Wodon (2002).
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TABLE 4
Summary of strategic questions and information needs
Questions Information needs
What is the level of service coverage among Conventional coverage statistics, broken down by income or consumption decile,
poor households? and preferably also by urban and rural areas. Percentage of households connected to
utility services which are poor. Unit price of utility service. Equivalent unit price of
substitute for utility service.
Can the poor afford the initial costs associated Connection charge divided by typical monthly household income of the poor (e.g.,
with connecting to the network? two minimum wages, or the family poverty line). Minimum monthly installment
required by utility to cover connection charge divided by typical monthly household
income of the poor. Percentage of households living in communities served by utilities
that are actually connected to the network, broken down by income or consumption
decile.
Can the poor afford to use infrastructure services Monthly utility bill for a subsistence consumption level, divided by typical monthly
once they have them? income of the poor. Actual monthly expenditure on utility services by connected
households as a share of household budget, broken down by income or consumption
decile. Actual monthly expenditure on substitutes for utility services by unconnected
households as a share of household budget, broken down by income or consumption
decile. Declared willingness to pay for utility service, broken down by income or
consumption decile.
What would be the cost of using the instrument? Estimated total resource cost of implementing the instrument. Estimated
administrative cost of using the instrument.
Does the instrument perform well in targeting Estimated percentage of beneficiaries that are poor. Estimated percentage of resources
terms? that leak away to unintended beneficiaries.
Would the instrument introduce perverse Anticipated behavioral impact on the utility. Anticipated behavioral impact on
incentives? intended beneficiaries and the rest of the population.
What should be the prioritization between Consumption Dominance Curves. Gini Index Decomposition.
services?
Source: Prepared by the authors.
VI
Final comments
One of the difficulties of implementing pro-poor
reforms is the need to take a coordinated approach
across three different areas of public policy:
privatization policy, social policy and regulatory policy.
These three areas should be viewed as complementary,
although the timing and institutional responsibility may
differ in each case (Estache, Gómez-Lobo and
Leipziger, 2000). Privatization policy and social policy
actions have to be considered early on in the reform
process. The regulatory framework should help to
ensure that the original strategic priorities are followed
through in implementation, and should incorporate the
flexibility needed to adjust over time.
Privatization transactions are often spearheaded by
the Ministry of Finance, which tends to view the process
in narrow transactional terms, with the focus on
maximizing the fiscal revenues from the asset sale. This
is unfortunate because there are trade-offs between the
sale value of assets and the economic and social impacts
of the reform. For example, revenue considerations
point towards keeping service tariffs high, minimizing
rollout obligations, postponing the introduction of
competition, and overlooking many of the details of
regulation. But experience shows that this type of
strategy is precisely that which is likely to be most
damaging to the poor, and to the infrastructure sector
115C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 8  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 2
MAKING INFRASTRUCTURE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA WORK FOR THE POOR  •  ANTONIO ESTACHE,
VIVIEN FOSTER AND QUENTIN WODON
Select Policy Instrument from 
Select Policy Instrument from 
Implement Both 
Implement Consumption Policies 
STOP 
Implement Access Policies 









Is access to the serviceaffordable 
for poor households? 
Select Policy Instrument from Table 2 
Is subsistence consumption of the 
service affordable for poor 
households? 
Select Polic  Instrument from Table 3 Select Policy Instrument from Table 3 
Is it feasible to finance policy 
instruments for both the access and 
the subsistence consumption issues? 
Are the instruments to promote access 
more cost effective than the instruments
to support consumption? 
Implement Both Policies 
Implement Consumption Policies Only 
DO 
NOTHING 
Is subsistence consumption of the 
service affordable for poor 
households? 
FIGURE 1
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more generally. It is critical that at the outset of any
privatization process there should be an attempt to form
a balanced view between the macroeconomic and
microeconomic impacts of the privatization. This points
towards having a broader representation of interests on
the transaction team, including the ministries
responsible for infrastructure and social policy, and not
only the Ministry of Finance. It also suggests that there
is potentially a need to realign the incentives of those
acting as advisers in the transactions, since they are
often paid success-based fees that reflect the sale value
of the infrastructure assets.
There are also linkages between social policy with
regard to utilities and a country’s wider strategy for
poverty reduction and social protection that need to be
understood. According to economic principles, social
policy concerns are most efficiently addressed by
channeling income transfers through the welfare
system, rather than by subsidizing tariffs for particular
goods and services (such as utilities). However, in many
developing countries the welfare system is not well
developed. Moreover, the administrative complexity
and governance issues surrounding welfare payments
may make utility services look like a practical second-
best approach to the achievement of social policy
objectives. Nevertheless, while it is politically attractive
to use utility pricing as a means of income
redistribution, the evidence suggests that such
redistribution can be regressive. If utility policy must
form part of a country’s social protection system, it is
essential that the corresponding measures be much
better designed than they have been in the past, and
that they be coherent with the wider welfare framework.
The function of the regulator is to act as an arbiter
between the competing interests of the operator, the
State and civil society. After the initial privatization
transaction is over, the decisions of the regulator have
the greatest impact on the tariffs faced by low-income
customers, the flexibility of service standards, the
degree of competition in the market, and the speed with
which networks are expanded into under-served areas.
Since conflicts arise between social and financial
concerns, governments must provide statutory
clarification of the extent to which the regulator is
responsible for meeting social objectives, and must
specify which policy instruments are at his disposal.
Recent evidence shows that effective regulation is
important for ensuring that poor consumers get their
fair share of the gains generated by the privatization
process (Chisari and Estache, 1999). In Argentina, the
gains from privatization increased when effective
regulation was taken into account, and the benefits of
effective regulation were found to be highest for the lowest
income quintiles, simply because regulation acts as a
mechanism for transferring rents from owners of capital
to consumers of services produced with that capital.
This paper has discussed many ways in which
infrastructure reform may impinge on the welfare of
poor households, and it has suggested instruments for
improving the impact of reform on the poor. While
status quo arrangements in utility industries (e.g., public
provision and poorly targeted subsidies) are not
beneficial to poor households, many among the poor
would benefit from the service expansion which may
be made possible through privatization and which
would allow them to avoid the high costs of alternative
services. Moreover, there is evidence that poor
households are willing or able to pay for reliable service.
The way markets are restructured, the way competition
is introduced and maintained, and the way regulatory
commitments are implemented will determine whether
reform is beneficial to the poor. Generally, the weaker
the regulatory structure, the less likely it is that the
concerns of the poor will be taken into account in public
policy decisions.
At a broader level, what is really needed is political
commitment. Infrastructure reform and privatization are
not substitutes for responsible, redistributive welfare
policies. But welfare reforms are complex and tend to
be implemented only very slowly. Policies that lead to
real welfare gains are needed in order to establish the
credibility of reforms that are in the interest of all in
the long run, and thus promote support for them. This
is why, in the short run, policymakers will have to
address many of the issues discussed in this paper.
Whether infrastructure reformers can hope to succeed
depends on the design of the reforms and the strategy
for implementing them, but they also depend on the
political will to put the poor at the centre of
infrastructure reform and to counter the interest groups
that may have a particularly strong incentive to maintain
the status quo.
(Original: English)
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